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Constitutional Limitations on the Taking of
Body Evidence
A criminal suspect's physical characteristics and features constitute
important evidence linking him with the crime charged or excluding
him from further suspicion.' Much of this evidence, such as the sus-
pect's sex, race, height, build, hair color, and facial marks, is openly
visible and hence accessible to the police once the suspect is in custody.
Presenting this evidence to eye-witnesses, however, may require the
suspect's cooperation in line-ups or similar identification procedures.
Other less accessible items of body evidence, such as the suspect's
fingerprints, the composition of his blood, and scars or other marks
normally concealed by clothing, may be secured only through intru-
sions of varying intensity into the suspect's privacy. Procedures that go
beyond simple police observation to obtain evidence from a suspect's
body may usefully be termed "body evidence examinations. "
2
In the relatively few cases involving body evidence to reach the
Supreme Court, the Federal Constitution has been interpreted to
permit most types of body evidence examinations. Recently, in cases
concerning blood tests,a line-ups,4 and voice5 and handwriting" identifi-
cations, the Court reaffirmed that the use of body evidence at trial does
not infringe the suspect's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.7 The Court has, however, held that the Constitution imposes
1. While this Note is not intended as an analysis of any particular case or group of
cases, the kinds of problems discussed are rather starkly presented by Wainwright v. New
Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1968) (certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted) (facts and
lower court holding are given in dissenting opinion of Warren, C.J.).
2. A more exhaustive presentation of the varieties of body evidente can be found in
8 J. WIGMOIRE, EVIDENCE § 2265 (McNaughton ed. 1961). Wigmore's compilation includes
two examinations, mental examinations and lie detector tests, which are excluded from
consideration here because they give rise to testimonial rather than real evidence.
3. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); cf. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
(1957) (due process).
4. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 269
(1967); cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (due process).
5. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
6. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
7. Other types of body evidence have likewise been held outside the privilege: Finger.
prints: Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 951
(1964); United States v. Krapf, 285 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1961), afj'g 180 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.
1960); United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932). Photographs: United States v.
Amorosa, 167 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1948). Removal of narcotics from rectum: Blackford v.
United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 914 (1958). Putting on
Clothing: Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252 (1919). Taking a stance: Schmerber v.




certain restraints on the manner in which body evidence may be taken.
Shocking brutality is proscribed by the constitutional guarantee of due
process,8 and in cases involving blood tests9 and fingerprinting" police
have been required to meet fourth amendment standards for reasonable
searches and seizures. Furthermore, for those examinations such as
line-ups that may be easily manipulated against an uncounseled suspect,
the Court has applied the sixth amendment's guarantee of right to
counsel."
Governmental attempts to obtain or use body evidence ' without
transgressing these constitutional limits raise two fundamental ques-
tions:13 (1) What government officer may lawfully require that a suspect
submit to a particular body evidence examination? and (2) What may
the state do if a suspect refuses to comply with an order authorizing
an examination?
I. Authorizing the Taking of Body Evidence
Present law and practice initially entrusts the power to authorize
body evidence examinations to the police and the prosecutor,14 and un-
justified refusal to comply with a police examination order is a viola-
8. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); cf. Sdimerber v. California. 384 U.S. 757
(1966); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). The due process guarantee also pro.
hibits examination procedures so unfair as to infect the trial itself. Cf. Stovall v. Denno,
388 US. 293, 301-02 (1967).
9. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
10. Davis v. Mississippi, 37 U.S.L.W. 4369 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1969); Bynum v. United States.
262 F.2d 465, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
11. United States v. Wade, 388 US. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California. 388 U.S. 263
(1967). Voice examinations, like line-ups, would also seemn to be a critical stage of the
criminal process. Examinations for body evidence capable of "s)stematized or scientific
[analysis]," United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227, and, specifically, the taking of hand-
writing exemplars, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. at 267, are not critical stages in the
same sense. Hence, the vast majority of examinations do not at present require presence
of counsel.
12. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court limiting the availability of the technique
of custodial interrogation are likely to result in heavier reliance on identifications and
other body evidence examinations, as police are required "to establish guilt by eiidence
independently and freely secured ..... " Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US. 1, 8 (1964).
13. This statement refers to the law in federal cases and in state cases under the
fourth amendment and due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Occasionally,
state constitutions have been held more restrictive on this type of evidence. E.g., Allen v.
State, 183 Md. 603, 39 A.2d 820 (1944) (putting on hat while on witness stand Yiolated
self-incrimination privilege); State v. Taylor, 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E. 2d 289 (1948) (speaking for
identification violated privilege). In addition, state statutes may limit the admissibility
of body evidence. This is particularly true, in the blood test area where several states
require actual consent to the test for admissibility. E.g., D.C. CODE A%,%,. § 1312 (Supp. 1,
1968), prior version construed in State v. Merrow, 161 Me. 111, 208 A.2d 659 (1965); WAvsu.
REv. CODE ANN. § 46.61, 505(3)-(4) (Supp. 1968).
14. V. LAFAVE, AuREs'r 24-28, 308-13 (1965). This is true at least when the body evi-
dence examination is given subsequent to a lawful arrest. The police may not, however,
take a body evidence examination as part of a general investigation prior to arrest without
a magistrate's warrant. Davis v. Mississippi, 37 U.S.L.W. 4359 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1969).
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tion of law.1 The dangers of reliance on police authorization for
normal searches have long been recognized. When unrestrained by
judicial officials, police officers who are engaged in "the often competi-
tive enterprise of ferreting out crime"10 will sometimes attempt to
invade citizens' privacy unreasonably.' 7 Since most victims of such
intrusions will be unable' 8 or unwilling9 to prevent a search, a formal
check is necessary to protect citizens from excessive police zeal. The
check provided in the Constitution is the fourth amendment's require-
ment that the police obtain prior approval of a search from a magis-
trate.20 Though some have criticized the practical effectiveness of the
warrant procedure as a restraint on police abuses,21 in theory the re-
quirement of a magistrate's scrutiny and authorization should dis-
courage the police from attempting clearly unjustified searches and
should permit a detached judicial officer to appropriately limit the
scope and intrusiveness of searches for which probable cause eXiStS. 22
15. Resistance to such an order of a police officer is punishable in every jurisdiction.
The precise statutory violation involved varies from state to state as does the perceived
seriousness of the violation and the severity of punishment. For example, the United States
Code and some state codes expressly punish interference with a search. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 2231 (1964) (felony) (up to 3 yr. imprisonment and/or $5,000 fine); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 54-33d (1968) (misdemeanor) (up to 1 yr. imprisonment and/or $1,000 fine). More cozn-
monly, statutes prohibiting "resistance to a public officer in the performance of his duty"
are applicable to this refusal. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 69 (West Supp. 1968) (mis-
demeanor) (up to 5 yr. imprisonment and/or $5,000 fine), § 148 (West Supp. 1968) (mis.
demeanor) (up to 1 yr. imprisonment and/or $1,000 fine); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 55-165
(1968) (misdemeanor) (up to 6 mo. imprisonment and/or $250 fine); IND. ANN. STAT. §
10-1005 (Supp. 1968) (misdemeanor) (up to 6 mo. imprisonment and/or $100 fine); N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 195.05 (McKinney 1967) (Class A misdemeanor) (up to 1 yr. imprisonment
and/or fine); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.040 (1961) (misdemeanor) (up to 90 days im-
prisonment and/or $250 fine). Forcible resistance is specifically punishable as an assault
in a few states. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.05(3) (McKinney 1967) (Class D felony)
(up to 7 yrs. imprisonment and/or fine); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.11.020(6) (1961) (felony)
(up to 10 yrs. imprisonment and/or $1,000 fine). See also tampering with physical evidence,
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40 (Class E felony) (up to 4 yrs. imprisonment and fine).
16. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
17. See, e.g., Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 846 (1957); McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451 (1948); United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1957).
18. E.g., United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1957).
19. It appears that suspects tend to be submissive to the police and rarely assert their
rights. This is so even where the police warn the suspect of his rights and inferentially
legitimize their exercise. One study of the effect of the Miranda decision concluded that
suspects who seemed to want to assert their fifth amendment rights very frequently did
confess regardless of warnings. Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of
Miranda, 76 YAx L.J. 1519, 1577-78 (1967).
Moreover, since the exclusionary rule will exclude any evidence discovered as a result
of an unconstitutional body evidence examination, suspects aware of their rights may be
tempted to forego assertion of those rights when faced with strong police pressures for
compliance and with the possibility of formal punishment for the erroneous good-faith
assertion of objections to an examination.
20. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 38, 392-93 (1914).
21. See Remington, The Law Relating to "On The Street" Detention, Questioning and
Frisking of Suspected Person and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J4 CaRIs. L.C, &
P.S. 386, 388 (1960).
22. For this to occur, it must be assumed, as the Supreme Court appears to assume,
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In recent cases involving housing inspections3 and eavesdropping,"-
the Supreme Court has emphasized the value of the warrant procedure
and has held that except in exigent circumstances no search is constitu-
tionally permissible unless it has been authorized by a magistrate.
Most body evidence examinations involve significant intrusions on
personal privacy and dignity beyond the intrusion of the arrest itself.
In an examination for hidden marks or objects that requires the suspect
to disrobe,25 the suspect must surrender his most elemental personal
privacy. In other examinations, such as blood or urine tests, the bodily
integrity of the suspect is invaded in ways that are offensive to some?3
Finally, in line-ups and voice identifications, the suspect suffers the
indignity of being exhibited as a criminal suspect27 to those members
of the public who claim to be witnesses of the crime charged. The
intrusiveness of these examinations would seem to require a finding
that they are "searches" or "seizures" governed by the fourth amend-
ment.
If intrusiveness alone is not enough, the possibilities for police abuse
are sufficient to justify employment of the warrant procedure when-
ever possible. The police may be tempted to seek body evidence of un-
solved crimes from an arrested suspect who could not be charged with
such crimes prior to the search.2 In some cases the police might arrest
a person for a minor crime merely as a pretext0 for an examination,
that truly independent magistrates exist and that requests for warrants are examined in
a judicial fashion. At the very least magistrates must be willing to say no to the police.
But see Spinelli v. United States, 593 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
23. Camara v. Municipal Court, 587 US. 523 (1967).
24. Katz v. United States, 589 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20 (1968) (stop and frisk).
25. E.g., United States v. Townsend, 151 Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1957); McManus v. Com-
monwealth, 264 Ky. 240, 94 S.W.2d 609 (1936); State v. Emerson, 266 Afiun. 217, 123
NAV.2d 382 (1963).
26. For this reason, perhaps, some states expressly make blood-alcohol testing volun-
tary. See note 13 supra.
27. The protection of a suspectes privacy as against the charge of being labeld a
criminal has occasionally been recognized. Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499
(1905); Downs v. Swarm, IIl Md. 53, 73 A. 653 (1909).
28. Evidence of a crime found in a search for evidence of another crime is properly
seizable and admissible. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947). But see FED. R.
CRat. P. 41(c) to -(e). This rule may be too great an encouragement to pretext arrests
and exploratory searches. Similar practices are common: for example, the use of custodial
interrogation to attempt to solve related crimes and to "clear" cases. Project, Interrogations
in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YA.E L.J. 1519 (1967).
29. This would seem to be the case in Wainwright v. City of New Orleans, 392 US.
598 (1968) (cert. dismissed as improvidently granted). See also Amador-Conzalez v. United
States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir.
1961). 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDER. PRAcricE AD PRocEtuRE § 667 (1969).
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based on no more than suspicion, 30 designed to find evidence of a more
serious offense. Even in the search for evidence of the crime for which
the suspect was arrested, the probable cause for arrest should sometimes
be held insufficient "probable cause" 3 ' for a particularly intrusive body
evidence examination desired by the police. To control these dangers
of abuse inherent in police authorization of intrusions, recent fourth
amendment cases involving housing inspections32 and eavesdropping"
suggest that the warrant procedure is the constitutionally mandated
remedy.
34
Unlike many searches away from the police station which are per-
mitted without warrant because the police must act immediately,5
body evidence examinations, with few exceptions, do not require im-
mediate action.3 The only common tests that would normally need
to be conducted without delay are blood and urine tests for alcohol or
narcotics. 3 7 For other examinations, police can practically seek war-
30. Where the police forego even the formality of a pretext arrest, body evidence
examinations are impermissible. Davis v. Mississippi, 37 U.S.L.W. 4359 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1969).
31. Probable cause is no longer being envisioned as a unitary concept; rather, probable
cause will vary with the nature and intrusiveness of the search. For a development of this
notion of "variable probable cause," see Note, Scope Limitations for Searches Incident to
Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 443 (1969); Note, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections,
77 YALE L.J. 521 (1968).
32. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
33. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
34. One theoretical alternative limitation of police discretion without resort to a war-
rant procedure-enactment of statutes authorizing specifically described and limited body
evidence examinations in specifically defined circumstances--would seem to be impractical
The task of defining in the abstract sufficient limitations on the police or of cataloging
with adequate detail the wide variety of contexts which would justify a body evidence
examination while simultaneously prohibiting all unconstitutional examinations is beyond
the ability of legislators. Such an attempt to codify the meaning of "probable cause" for
these examinations would either fetter the government unduly or leave the police with
virutally all the discretion they have today.
35. Warrantless searches are permitted if incident to a lawful arrest. The basis of the
exception is the protection of the officer, the prevention of flight and the preservation of
evidence against destruction by the suspect. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367
(1964). Similarly, searches of automobiles and other movables and simple frisks are per.
missible in certain circumstances. See Note, Scope Limitations for Searches Incident to
Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 443 (1969); Cardin, Federal Power to Seize and Search Without War-
rant, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1964).
36. Davis v. Mississippi, 37 U.S.L.W. 4359, 4361 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1969).
37. The most common exception is blood-alcohol testing for driving while intoxicated.
The level of blood-alcohol declines so rapidly that immediate testing is necessary to Insure
accuracy; indeed, it appears that a delay of two hours after apprehension makes the test
results meaningless. See N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFric LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
Therefore, warrantless testing is proper. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770.71
(1966). For a further discussion of special procedures made necessary by this property of
blood-alcohol testing, see note 92 infra. A few less common tests also measure deteriorative
evidence, e.g., urine tests for narcotics and the nitrate test for recent firing of guns. These
too could be administered immediately after a lawful arrest without a warrant untder the
Schmerber rationale. Finally, it may be necessary to conduct an immediate "show-up" If
an eyewitness is near death. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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rants since the suspect is in custody3  and the passage of time will not
alter the examination results.39
Besides cases in which there is not time to seek a warrant, the only
further exception to the warrant requirement should be for examina-
tions that are part of the arrest and booking process. Fingerprinting
and photographing, for example, involve only minimal additional in-
trusions beyond custody itself and yet are important to the state for
administrative and security reasons.4 0 Moreover, the probable cause
needed for arrest almost always will justify these small intrusions nec-
essary for the maintenance of an efficient jail system.41 Thus the
balance should be struck in favor of allowing the police to conduct
these examinations without obtaining a warrant. Except for these
examinations basic to police operations, only exigent circumstances
should justify bypassing the protections afforded by the warrant pro-
cedure.
If the fourth amendment's warrant requirement is applied to body
evidence examinations, a suspect's uncounselled consent to a warrant-
less examination should never be taken as a waiver of the right to a
magistrate's authorization. 4- A suspect being forcibly detained by police
in the coercive atmosphere of the station house cannot be taken to have
freely consented to a police request that he yield his rights to a war-
rant.43 A court should find a valid waiver of the warrant right only
when a suspect consents to a warrantless examination on the advice of
38. It is precisely this need to bring the suspect into custody thereby preventing flight
and the destruction of evidence that justifies the police in arresting without warrants if
probable cause exists. See Ford v. United States, 352 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1965). This policy
of immediate custody, together with a policy of preventing violence, has led some states
to limit the right of suspects to resist arrest regardless of legality. See the discussion in
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, Comment (rent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
39. Compare the housing inspection area where there are no exigent circumstances and
the timing of the searches is at the discretion of the inspector. Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Similarly, the use of administrative warrants or warrants examined by the district
attorney may not satisfy the constitutional standard. But see Abel v. United States. S62
U.S. 217 (1960).
40. The recent Davis case is not to the contrary. There the fingerprinting occurred
during an illegal detention as part of a dragnet investigation. Additionally, the purpose
of the test was an evidentiary one solely, and it is therefore unlike the routine finger-
printing here excepted from the warrant requirement. Davis v. Mississippi, 37 U.S.L.W.
4359 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1969).
41. Full strip searches of arrested suspects are frequently made and justified a% a
matter of routine to insure the security of the jail. Since a partial strip and a dose pat-
down would be enough to sufficiently yield all but tile most esoteric weapons, the rubric
of administrative routine should not extend this far.
42. For a discussion of the problem of "consent" searches in a different context, sec
Note, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YA L.J. 521, 528.29 (196S).
43. Cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 542, 546-50 (1968) (cosent to -&arch cannot
be relied on where a householder submits to police claiming to possess a warrant).
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counsel or before the magistrate himself. Unless counsel for a suspect
is present, the police should not be permitted even to ask a suspect to
cooperate in an examination that has not received a magistrate's
approval.
44
In contrast to present practice in the issuance of most arrest and
search warrants, it would probably be desirable to permit a suspect to
raise objections to the issuance of the examination warrant.45 With
the suspect in custody, the primary reason for issuing arrest and search
warrants ex parte-to avoid giving warning to a suspect who might
flee the jurisdiction or conceal the evidence sought before the warrant
could be executed-would not apply; even the most detailed knowl-
edge of the examination proposed would not enable the suspect to alter
or conceal his physical features successfully. 4 Permitting adversary
proceedings on the issuance of these warrants should make the magis-
trate's authorization a more meaningful curb on police demands since
the presentation of objections would counter possible tendencies for a
magistrate merely to rubber-stamp the police department decisions he
is supposed to control.47 At such a hearing,48 the suspect could dispute
the existence of probable cause for the proposed examination or ask
44. This concept of waiver is admittedly more restrictive than that permissible in the
case of other guarantees; particularly, it goes beyond that adopted in Miranda In not
permitting an uncounseled waiver. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-77 (1966).
The need to go beyond the Miranda formula is in the first instance suggested by the
failure of that formula. Project, supra note 19, at 1562-68, 1615-16. Secondly, the rule
sharply reflects the problems of proof of a knowing waiver. Thus, waivers of both counsel
and the warrant are disallowed. Finally, the limitation imposed on legitimate police In.
vestigation is less serious than in the case of confessions. The police (and the suspect) are
"handcuffed" only until the suspect can be brought before a magistrate, before whom the
suspect may waive his right to counsel, see p. 1081 infra, and all objections to the search.
See also note 46 infra.
45. Although some states have statutes providing that a suspect may controvert the
allegations of a warrant, these states in fact refer to proceedings for suppression and return
of evidence rather than an adversary warrant procedure. CAL. PENAL CooY, § 1589 (West
Cum. Supp. 1968); N.Y. CODE OF CRIu,. PROC. § 807-08 (1958), construed in People v, Hoy,
54 Misc. 2d 1083, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1967); People v. Brown, 40 Misc. 2d 35, 242 N.YS.2d
555 (1963).
46. These arguments apply whether or not the suspect has yet been brought before a
magistrate and admitted to bail. Where the bail hearing precedes the body examination,
bail can of couse be conditioned upon the suspect remaining available for line-ups, blood-
tests, and so forth. Only in the unlikely case in which freedom may enable the suspect to
change his physical characteristics-by a hair-cut, for example-might bail be denlied
until the police have examined him. Since the need for a body-evidence examination will
not normally introduce another factor relevant to bail, the danger that, for example,
station-house bail would be denied to a suspect because the no-waiver-without-counsel
rule precludes an immediate physical examination, should not overbalance the usefulness
of the rule.
47. Miller & Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study o/
Current Practices, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Remington, supra note 21.
48. The mere fact that this warrant procedure is adversary should not make it res
judicata to a later examination of the warrant issues, since there is no appeal and since
the magistrates court is one of inferior jurisdiction. See pp. 1090-91 infra; cf. People v.
Ortiz, 29 App. Div. 2d 392, 280 N.Y.S2d 480 (1967) (semble).
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for safeguards to prevent unfairness409 and unnecessary intrusiveness rA
Short oral 5' or written presentations, supported where appropriate by
affidavits, should be adequate to bring to the attention of the magistrate
the suspect's objections without making the warrant issuing process
unduly slow and costly.
2
The proposed system of judicial authorization after an abbreviated
adversary hearing would obviously not fully protect the suspect unless
he were entitled to be represented by counsel at the authorization hear-
ing. Since the examination warrant hearing is the only point at which
the suspect can effectively assert his rights to personal privacy and
dignity by preventing an unconstitutional examination, the sixth
amendment guarantee of the right to the assistance of counsel should
be applicable.0
II. Obtaining the Suspect's Cooperation in a
Lawfully Authorized Examination
Once a police officer or a magistrate has authorized a specific body
evidence examination, the great majority of suspects readily cooperate.
49. This would appear to be the most appropriate method of effectuating the protec-
tion sought to be insured by United States v. Wade. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). This procedure
would make the lawyer more than merely a passive observer but give him an active role
in providing a fair identification procedure.
50. The suspect should also be permitted to put fonard bona fide medical and
religious objections. In addition, uses of the examination that unduly invade the privacy
of the suspect could be prevented. See cases cited note 27 supra.
51. Federal practice requires that only written presentations may be used in the wur-
rant procedure, yet the magistrate may question the police officers about assertions made
in their presentation. United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
State practice permits oral testimony. There would appear to be no objections to oral
presentations if a proper record could be made at tls hearing. See State v. Chakos, -
Wash. 2d -, 443 P.2d 815 (1968), cert. denied sub noan. State v. Christofferson. 393 U.S.
1090 (1969) (dissent of Brennan, J.); State v. Walcott, - Wash. 2d -, 435 P.2d 994, 999
(1968). See generally 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAcriCE AND PRocrEDui. § 670 (1959).
52. The objective is to avoid a costly extended hearing. Similarly, it might be possible
to save some time by combining the warrant process with another hearing before the
magistrate. This could be done at the time of advice as to rights and admission to bail.
See FEn. R. Cium. P. 5(b); note 46 supra. It might also be possible to combine the warrant
hearing with the preliminary examination. See FED. R. CmRi. P. 5(c). This result is les
desirable since the usual practice is that at this point the police have completed all in-
vestigation and the decision to prosecute has been made. The body evidence examination
may properly be given during the investigatory stage.
53, The right to counsel at the preliminary hearing is recognized in federal law, but
not yet constitutionally required. Here, however, there seems to be a valid "critical stage"
argument. Cf. the "lost defences" test of White v. Maryland, 373 US. 59 (1963). and
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 US. 52 (1960). In addition, the right to counsel laid down in
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), would seem best implemented by such an
adversary hearing. It is worth noting that a suggestion by counsel of a different vay of
taking some particular evidence may reduce the danger to the police that the evidence
may later be suppressed.
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Most no doubt do so out of a general respect for authority.5 ' Others
who would be tempted not to may often yield because they fear in-
formal penalties-suspects may well feel that uncooperative conduct
will bring less favorable treatment on questions committed to police
or prosecutorial discretion, such as where they will be jailed and what
amount of bail will be sought at arraignment. 5 Though reasonable
obedience of police orders is desirable, the unchecked use of the threat
of informal penalties to obtain that obedience is not.',
To enable the state to obtain necessary body evidence and, co-
ordinately, to prevent misuse of the discretionary powers of police and
prosecutor, formal measures must be available to deal with cases of
noncooperation. 57 In the past, the police have responded to resistance
in two ways: sometimes the fact that the suspect refused to comply with
an examination order has been admitted into evidence 8 at trial as a
substitute for the evidence sought in the examination; more frequently,
the police have used force 59 to carry out the examination or have
attempted to compel the suspect's submission by threatening to seek
the imposition of formal punishment for noncooperation.00
A. Evidentiary Use of the Fact of a Suspect's Refusal to Cooperate
One possible response to a suspect's refusal to cooperate is to accept
the refusal and offer the fact of noncooperation in evidence against the
suspect. Such an approach is now used in some states when a person
charged with driving while intoxicated refuses to submit to a blood-
alcohol test. 61 The fact of refusal is relevant as circumstantial evidence
54. See by analogy the reaction to interrogation discussed in Project, supra note 19,
at 1562-78.
55. W. LAFAVE, ARREST 132-37, 192 (1965); Project, supra note 19, at 1515.
56. See p. 1085 infra.
57. Although the vast majority submit, a small and possibly growing number resist,
The causes of resistance are many. First, and probably most likely, is awareness of guilt.
Similarly, a suspect may resist to avoid disclosure of prior criminal activity or to attempt
to protect another. Others may resist because they misapprehend their rights or because
they seek to expand their rights by self-help. Resistance may be induced by a fear of
harassment or unfairness at the hands of the police. Finally, resistance may spring from
medical, religious, or dignitary objections or simple emotional shock and confusion.
58. E.g., People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 421 P,2d 393 (1966); People
v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393, 421 P.2d 401 (1966); cf. 2 J. w'itoitE, Vv.
DENCE § 275-76 (1940).
59. E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d
262 (9th Cir. 1961); Smith v. United States, 187 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 927 (1951); United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1957).
60. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1964). The formal means have been used far more fre-
quently to compel testimony rather than to compel body evidence examinations. Shillitani
v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966); Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(6) (1965); People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 55 Cal. Rptr.
393, 421 P.2d 401 (1966). Contra, VA. CoDE § 18.1-55.1(i) (Supp. 1968).
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of the suspect's belief that the results of the examination would have
been incriminating. 2 Evidence of refusal to cooperate in an examina-
tion thus can take substantially the same place in the prosecution's
chain of proof as the body evidence that the prosecution sought to
obtain through the resisted examination.63
Although this response avoids the use of force, it is best rejected
because it yields inferior evidence and is in general unduly prejudicial
to defendants. The evidence of refusal is most obviously improper
when the evidence sought in an examination is not relevant to the
prosecution's chain of proof. But even in the trial context, the evidence
of a suspect's refusal to cooperate is less reliable than the evidence
produced by a body evidence examination since a suspect may refuse
to cooperate for reasons other than a fear that the examination would
yield evidence of guilt.64 The jury, however, may often disregard this
deficiency in probative value and ascribe undue weight to the evidence
of refusal because of an exaggerated sensitivity to the evidence as an
indication that the defendant believes that he is guilty65 Moreover,
the jury may be tempted to convict the defendant of the substantive
offense charged as a punishment 0 for the collateral and comparatively
minor6 7 offense of noncompliance with an examination order. The
possibility for prejudice is increased if the suspect had an innocent
reason for refusing the examination but cannot personally present his
explanation to the jury because, for other reasons, he exercises his
privilege not to testify.68
Not only is evidence of refusal a crude and often prejudicial substi-
62. cf. 2 J. WIxI.oPE, EVIDENCE § 285-291 (1940); 8 J. WXIC.MORE, EoIDENc § 2272-73
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1951) (failure to produce evidence gives rise to inference that eCi-
dence is unfavorable).
63. Additionally, the evidence may serve the more general function of showing the
suspect's consciousness of guilt. People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 537-38, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385,
389, 421 P.2d 393, 397 (1966); cf. 2 J. WIG o IE, EVIDENCE § 273-76 (1910). Traynor's dis-
cussion in Ellis is the most cogent statement of the arguments for admission of this type
of evidence.
64. State v. Paschal, 253 N.C. 795, 117 S.E.2d 749 (1961) (defendant feared he would
have to pay for the test); Columbus v. Mullis, 162 Ohio St. 419. 123 N.E.2d 422 (1954)
(defendant refused to submit to test without presence of doctor); Engler v. State, 316 P.2d
6295 (OkIla. Crim. 1957) (bona fide doubts as to reliability); cf. Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 483 n.10 (1963) (flight doctrine questioned).
65. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US. 471, 483 n.10 (1963); Miller v. United States.
320 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1963). See also Hubbard v. State. 202 Miss. 229. 30 So.2d 901 (1947).66. The evidence is admissible only to give rise to an inference of suspect's belief that
the evidence would incriminate him and of his guilty, state of mind. It does not create
a presumption of guilt. See State v. Mobley, 273 N.C. 471, 160 S.E.2d 334 (1968).
67. See note 15 supra.
68. Griffin v. California, 380 US. 609, 615 (1965). One might question whether the
admission of the evidence of refusal with its accompanying pressure on defendant to
testify to explain his refual may not be considered compulsion to testify prohibited by
Griffi.
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tute for the body evidence itself, but under some circumstances the
admission of evidence of refusal might be viewed as transgressing the
fifth amendment's command that "No person shall be... compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ."9 Evidence of a
suspect's refusal, whether expressed orally or by physical resistance,10 is
relevant to the crime charged only in its testimonial aspect, as the ap-
proximate equivalent of the statement, "Because I fear that the exami-
nation will produce evidence of my guilt, I refuse to permit it." There.
fore, the privilege against self-incrimination seems relevant. 1 There
remains the question of whether such testimonial evidence is "com-
pelled" for purposes of applying the fifth amendment standard. In one
sense the testimonial action is obviously not compelled-the state is
not ordering the suspect to refuse cooperation. But the state does
compel a suspect to choose7 2 between submitting to a perhaps unpleas-
ant examination and producing testimonial evidence against himself."
The suspect's option to submit to a lawfully imposed burden instead of
implicitly testifying against himself does not necessarily save the pro.
cedure: lifting a lawful burden-the examination-is in effect an in-
ducement 74 that casts doubt on the "voluntariness ' '71 of the testimonial
evidence thereby obtained.
69. US. CONsT. amend. V.
70. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 n.5 (1966).
71. This argument is suggested by a confusing footnote in Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 765-66 n.9 (1966), from which it can be argued that evidence of any refusal
to cooperate is not admissible because it is a tacit admission of guilt. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1968); Smith v. Brierly, 384 F2d 992 (3d Cir. 1967), Staino
v. Brierly, 387 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v. Bravecz, 424 Pa. 582, 227 A.2d
904 (1967); Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions in Light of the Expanding Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 52 CoaN. L.Q. 338 (1967); Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions, 112 U. PA.
L. R v. 210 (1963). The California Supreme Court has refused to follow the Sch,,wrbar
lead. "[G]uilty conduct is not a testimonial statement of guilt. By acting like a guilty
person, a man does not testify to his guilt but merely exposes himself to the drawing of
inferences from circumstantial evidence of his state of mind." People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d
529, 537-38, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 389-90, 421 P.2d 393, 397-98 (1966). See also note 76 Infra.
If it seems peculiar to allow the police to require cooperation in getting a voice sample
for use as evidence and at the same time forbid them from using a refusal to cooperate
as evidence, it is the Schmerber dictum-that a voice sample is not testimonial-that Is
the source of the anomaly. See note 92 infra.
72. This construction depends, of course, on the fact that the suspect is Informed that
this is his choice--to submit or to have his refusal offered against him. Likewise, It Is
crucial that the state use only the evidentiary penalty.
73. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (defendant's incriminating testi-
mony at unsuccessful suppression hearing was inadmissible at the trial in chief, tie
hearing testimony was not voluntary where defendant sought the "benefit" of the exclu-
sionary rule).
74. The fact that the burden is lawful is Irrelevant. For example, If the government
offered to forgive a suspect's taxes should he testify, clearly the testimony would not be
voluntary.
75. The concept of voluntariness has been strictly interpreted in the confession cases.
See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1963); Brain v. United States, 168
U.S. 532, 543, 554, 562-65 (1897).
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Thus the element of compelled self-incrimination inherent in the use
against a suspect of evidence of noncooperation raises firther questions
regarding the propriety of this means of dealing with a suspect's refusal
to cooperate in an authorized body evidence examination." The con-
stitutional doubt coupled with the relative weakness of the evidence of
refusal and the danger of prejudicial reaction by a jury would seem to
require that a state face squarely77 the problem of compelling examina-
tions instead of evading the problem by allowing noncooperation to be
admissible as evidence of the substantive offense.
B. Use of Physical Force by the Police
The most direct way to carry out an authorized body evidence ex-
amination that a suspect resists would be to use physical force. In theory
force could be used by the police either punitively to break the suspect's
will to resist by making resistance too painful, or nonpunitively to
carry out the examination over the suspect's contrary will. The funda-
mental principle that governmental punishment must be judicially
imposed"8 clearly precludes police-initiated use of physical force to
break the suspect's will to resist, but there is no similar constitutional
prohibition against the reasonable use by the police of nonpunitive
restraining force to obtain body evidence. 0 Only a few types of body
evidence can be taken from a suspect firmly bent on resistance, how-
ever, if the force used is limited to restraining force.80 A sample of hair
76. Like most arguments about the privilege against self-incrimination, the one pre-
sented here would seem to prove too much. It would not, of course, reach all evidence
of conduct manifesting consciousness of guilt, but only such evidence -where the element
of legal compulsion was present. Thus, flight from the scene of a crime would normally
be admissible, but destruction of evidence, where that is-quite legitimately-made a
separate offense, would not. See note 92 infra.
77. Cf. State v. Jones, 277 Minn. 174, 152 N.W.2d 67 (1967) (state could not rely on
inference from failure of codefendant to testify if state could compel the testimony by
grant of immunity).
78. Kennedy v. Mlendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303, 316 (1946); Screws v. United States, 325 US. 91 (1915). See also Oestereich v.
Selective Service System Local Board No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
79. Cf. Costello v. United States, 298 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962). The outside limit on the
use of force in search is set by Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
80. Even the most simple of examinations may not be amenable to the use of re-
straining force. For example, it may be possible for a suspect to smudge his fingerprints
by slight movements that could not be prevented by restraint.
Some of these examinations which cannot be carried out by the use of restraining force.
could be carried out by making the suspect's will to resist irrelevant through te ufe of
deception. Thus, his speech could be recorded by bugs planted in the cell, and the suspect
could be observed or photographed in his cell through a concealed peephole. There are
no published reports of such examinations through deception, and there is reason to feel
that most such examinations would run afoul of the fourth amendment's requirements
by unnecessarily invading the privacy of arrested suspects. Since deception is normally
effective only if it is not announced in advance, it would not be possible to ask suspects
to cooperate and then to use deception only against those who refuse. Hence, some victims
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may be cut, a sample of blood may be taken, and the suspect may be
stripped and examined for scars or other marks, but no amount of
nonpunitive force"' can bring forth an example of the suspect's voice
and handwriting
8 2
Although the use of reasonable restraining force in the few cases in
which it is sufficient is no more objectionable constitutionally than the
use of force when necessary to carry out an authorized search of a
dwelling, 3 when force is used not to open a locked door but rather to
hold a suspect still while a sample of blood is taken, the opportunity
exists for police officers to apply a certain amount of corporal punish-
ment thinly disguised as restraint.
84
Because permissible restraining force may verge imperceptibly into
impermissible punitive force, the use of restraining force to effect an
authorized body evidence examination should be strictly limited to
situations in which the evidence sought must be obtained quickly 3
and the examination can be conducted without the cooperation of the
suspect. The police should never even attempt to conduct an examina-
tion by force if using force to restrain or move the suspect's body against
his will would not be sufficient to obtain the desired evidence.8 Even
when restraining force alone will be sufficient and the evidence must
be obtained quickly or not at all, a magistrate rather than a police
officer should whenever possible pass on the necessity for the particular
application of force that the police propose to employ.
of deceptive examinations would have to be persons against whom the use of deception
was unnecessary. For all suspects subjected to unannounced intrusion of the deceptive
surreptitious examination, it is a substantially greater intrusion on the privacy and
dignity of the suspect than an examination pursuant to a publicly issued warrant. In
view of the fact that open coercion is possible, the government would not seem justified
in conducting examinations through deception.
Examinations could also be taken if a suspect were drugged so that he was unwilling
or unable to resist. Such a practice would seem sufficiently offensive to community stan-
dards of decency in law enforcement as to be a denial of due process.
81. Restraining or nonpunitive force in the text refers to that minimal force necessary
merely to hold a suspect stationary and disable him from interfering with an examination.
82. Restraining force could be equally ineffective in carrying out a line-up against a
suspect's will. If a suspect actively resists during the line-up, he calls attention to himself
and thereby makes more doubtful the reliability of the line-up. To adieve laboratory
conditions, it would then be necessary to restrain all suspects, a rather ludicrous result.
Neither of these results is acceptable if judicial compulsion is available.
83. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964); CAL. P&NAL CODE § 1531 (West 1956); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963); United States v. Whiting, 311 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 935 (1963); United States v. Gorman, 208 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
84. This may have been the case in United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378
(D.D.C. 1957).
85. This would apply to the examinations described at pp. 1078-79 supra, with the
exception of blood-alcohol tests for which a special procedure is desirable. See note 92
infra.
86. The caution refers particularly to examinations of voice and handwriting that
cannot be taken over the resistance of the suspect.
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To guard against the danger that the force employed may exceed
legitimate bounds, it would be highly desirable to monitor in some
way any examinations carried out against the will of a suspect. Taking
motion pictures of the examination would be a relatively inexpensive
solution.8 7 A more effective but more costly alternative would be to
require the presence of the suspect's counsel at any forced examina-
tion. 8
C. Judicially Authorized Punishment for Noncooperation
Except for the few occasions in which restraining force is appropriate,
a recalcitrant suspect should be induced to cooperate in an authorized
body evidence examination only through the threat and use of ju-
dicially authorized punishment. This punishment can serve two related
functions: to deter the initial act of noncompliance and to induce
eventual compliance from a suspect who has refused to cooperate.
Clearly the appropriate punishment for an initial act of noncom-
pliance is the penalty that is usually imposed for petty crimes-a short
jail sentence or fine. When the examination has been properly autho-
rized by a police officer under circumstances permitting no delay, sud
a sentence may be imposed under the obstructing justice statutess9
that prohibit disobedience to a policeman's lawful order. When the
authorization is by magistrate, similar sentences may be imposed as a
punishment for the suspect's criminal contempt of the magistrate's
warrant,90 which should be viewed as a judicial order directed in
part to the suspect.91
But criminal penalties for past noncompliance are not alone suffi-
cient to induce the prompt compliance required by the state;92 to
87. The use of cameras in the station house is not unknown. A few western cities have
tried this procedure to obtain ironclad evidence of drunkenness. See generally Note, Self-
Incrimination: Testimonial vs. Non-Testimonial Evidence, 43 DL',vER L.J. 501 (1966);
Note, Sound Motion Pictures as Evidence of Intoxication in Drunken Driving Prosecu-
tions: Constitutional Standards, 52 CoRN. L.Q. 323 (1967); Seymour, Admissibiliy of Police
Movies of Drunk Drivers, 1966 Ixs. LJ. 754.
88. Counsel is presently required at line-ups, United States v. Wade. 388 U.S. 218,
228-39 (1967), but not when handwriting or voice samples are taken. Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967); see note 11, supra. Since force and unfairness are alwa)s possible with
body examinations it would be desirable to have counsel present at all examinations.
89. See note 15 supra.
90. E.g., Bryan v. State, 99 Ark. 163, 137 S.W. 561 (1911); Critelli v. Tidrick, 244 Iow,,a
462, 56 N.W.2d 159 (1952); Battini v. Grund, 244 Iowa 623, 56 N.W.2d 166 (1952); Burtch
v. Zeuch, 200 Iowa 49, 202 NAV. 542 (1925).
91. No jury trial is necessary if the sentence is shorter than 6 months. Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
92. This may be particularly true of blood-alcohol examinations where a short penalty
after the fact would be little inducement to comply. Several states responded to this
problem by the enactment of implied consent statutes. To induce compliance with the
examination, such statutes require that a suspect lawfully arrested for driving while in-
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the short fixed jail sentence should be added the traditional sanction
used to compel obedience to a court order: incarceration for civil
contempt of court 93 until the contemnor complies with the order or
compliance becomes impossible or unnecessary.0 4 Any fixed-term sen-
tence for noncompliance should not begin until after the civil com-
mitment is terminated, to prevent the fixed sentence from cancelling
the immediate coercive impact of the commitment for civil contempt00
In the vast majority of cases, the threat of criminal punishment and
toxicated submit to a test for blood-alcohol on penalty of license suspension. This penalty
is sufficiently severe that most submit. Indeed, it is often a matter of indifference to the
state if they refuse since in either case drunken drivers' licenses are suspended.
Details vary from state to state but all statutes contain the characteristic penalty scheme
and the implied consent rationale. This rationale is that all drivers in the state
consent to the examination in return for the privilege of driving in the state. Cf. Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
Although there has been no Supreme Court adjudication of constitutionality, several
state courts have upheld these statutes. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 257 Iowa 1052, 1062.63,
135 N.W.2d 518, 525 (1965) (dictum); Ballou v. Kelly, 12 Misc. 2d 178, 176 N.Y.S.2d 1005
(Sup. Ct.) (1958). Representative state statutes are: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-2276 (Supp.
1968); N.Y. VEs. & T.AF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1968); N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 20-16.2
(1965) (penalty is admissibility of refusal to submit to exam), N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01
et seq. (1960); VA. CODE § 18.1-55.1 (Supp. 1968); see Comment, The Status of Implied
Consent Legislation Since Schmerber v. California, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 168; Alcohol Test.
ing: Connecticut's Implied Consent Statute, 38 CONN. B.J. 16 (1964); Comment, Chemical
Tests and Implied Consent, 42 N.C.L. REv. 841 (1964); Comment, Virginia's Implied Con-
sent Statute: A Survey and Appraisal, 49 VA. L. REv. 386 (1963). See also Breithapt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 435 (1957) (absence of conscious consent, without more, does not neces-
sarily render the taking of blood unconstitutional).
Today this conditioned privilege theory is less acceptable constitutionally; but reliance
on the theory of implied consent to avoid fifth amendment problems is unnecessary in
the light of Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
Since the sanction for refusal to take a blood-alcohol examination test may be almost
as severe as-and nearly identical to-the sanction for drunken driving, it may seem un-
necessarily baroque to allow punishment for the refusal and not allow the refusal to be
conclusive on the issue of drunkenness in the trial for the substantive offense. But the
distinction, while it may be purely formal from the perspective of the criminal sanctions,
does seem to reflect some of the values which the privilege against self.incrimination has
been taken to protect.
93. This is the method most frequently used to compel testimony. Shillitanil v. United
States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966); Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957). The imprisoned Is
said to hold the "keys to his prison." In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1002). No Jury
trial is required for civil contempt. Shillitani v. United States, supra.
94. Compliance might become impossible or unnecessary because an eye-witness (ties,
because the statute of limitations ran, if the trial were completed, or because the evidence
were otherwise renderd useless. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
95. The combination of sanctions for criminal and civil contempt is permissible. Yates
v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 74 (1957) (no double jeopardl). When a police officer's
authorization is resisted, the sanction of imprisonment for civi contempt can be imposed
only if the police order is first transformed into a judicial order. This is clear from the
fact that 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) refers only to orders of courts. The contempt sanction arose
and exists to vindicate the judiciary and its process. Yet it would be a simple matter for
the court sentencing a suspect for disobeying a police order to adopt that order as Its
own and commit the suspect until he complies. As part of the trial for obstruction of
justice, the court would have heard and decided any objections to the lawfulness of the
police order. At the time of sentencing the court could easily order the defendant to
comply with that initial order. Hence it would be possible to combine a criminal penalty
with commitment for civil contempt regardless of whether the order for an examinatlon
is given initially by a magistrate or a police officer,
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commitment for civil contempt should induce prompt cooperation
from reluctant suspects, but in a very unusual set of circumstances
the sentence of imprisonment until compliance may offer little or no
inducement for a suspect to cooperate. Thus a suspect who could not
hope for release on bail90 and who would certainly be convicted and
imprisoned for a long term if the withheld body evidence was made
available to the police, would face extended incarceration regardless
of whether he cooperated in the body evidence examination. Such a
suspect might find it a good tactic to refuse cooperation for a very
extended period with the objective of weakening the prosecution's
case through delay.9 7 To meet such an exceptional case, once it appeared
that the threat of extended incarceration would not bring compliance,
the body evidence should, if possible, be taken by the use of restraining
force. If this alternative is unavailable, the state should either try the
suspect without the disputed evidence; or, if a trial without the body
evidence would be futile, the state should be permitted to delay the
trial until the suspect cooperates98 and in the interim to preserve
essential testimony for an eventual trial by taking depositions of key
witnesses.99
At the trial of a suspect for noncompliance with an authorized
examination, the suspect must, of course, be permitted to show cause
why he should not be punishedlO° To insure that no suspect is punished
for refusing to cooperate in an authorized examination without at
least one judicial evaluation of his objections to the examination, a
suspect being tried for noncooperation must be allowed to challenge
the legality of that examination if it wras authorized only by a police
officer.10' The police-authorized examination could be attacked on the
96. Capital offenses are usually non-bailable. FEn. R. CRxss. P. 46(a)(1); 3 C. WzUGcrr.
FEDERAL PRAcncE A'D PROCEDURE § 765 (1969). The same would be true of a suspect who
reasonably apprehended that bail would be set beyond his resources.
97. A second objective could be to await the death of an eyc-witness or one of the
other events that would make the examination impossible and thus require the suspect's
release. See note 94 supra.
98. Delay caused by the defendant himself is not a denial of his right to a speedy
trial. Powell v. United States, 352 F.2d 705, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Smith v. United States.
331 F.2d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1964); cf. Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361, 366-67 (5th Cir.
1962) (delay caused by prosecution and third party).
99. Use of these depositions at trial is not a denial of defendant's right to confront
witnesses if the witness is actually unavailable and defendant is given an opportunity
to cross-examine when the depositions are taken. See Barber v. Page. 390 U.S. 719, 725-26
(1968).
100. See Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965); In rc Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273-78
(1948); Hooley v. United States, 209 F.2d 219, 222-23 (1st Cir. 1954); FED. R. Ctu.t. P.
§ 42(b).
101. That is to say that the illegality of the examination or arrest may be raised as
a defense. Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900); People v. Cedeno, 218 Cal. App.
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same grounds that are available when a suspect is raising objections to
a magistrate's issuance of an examination warrant; 0 2 however, if po-
lice authorization is confined to routine examinations such as finger-
printing, the only objection that would normally be raised would be an
objection to the lawfulness of the arrest of which the examination was
a part.10 3
It is less clear that suspects should be allowed to attack the legality
of an authorized examination when a magistrate has heard and denied
the suspect's claims. 104 For a trial judge to hear arguments already
rejected by the authorizing magistrate involves what may seem a
wasteful duplication of judicial effort. In addition one might accept
the position taken by the Supreme Court in other contexts that even
an invalid judicial order must be respected and that disobedience to
such an order may be punished to vindicate the dignity of the issuing
authority. 05 This rule is perhaps less harsh when applied to body
evidence examinations since any evidence produced as a result of an
illegal examination may later be suppressed prior to trial' 0 -an un-
lawful examination thus constitutes no threat to the security of the
suspect though it is still an invasion of his privacy and dignity.
Against these arguments are to be set arguments based on the im-
portance of preventing judicial compulsion of unlawful intrusions on
a suspect. If a suspect's claim was erroneously rejected by the authoriz-
ing magistrate but is not heard by the judge sentencing for contempt,
the result will be to compel the suspect by threat of indefinite imprison-
ment to submit to an unjustifiable examination. Since a magistrate's
consideration of the legality of proposed examinations will often be
cursory and superficial, 0 7 such subversions of individual rights and
the integrity of the courts could easily occur. A second, more careful
2d 213, 227, 32 Cal. Rptr. 246, 255 (1963); Jackson v. Superior Ct., 98 Cal. App. 2d 183,
219 P.2d 879 (1950); People v. Ross, 19 Cal. App. 469, 126 P. 375 (1912); State v. Mobley,
240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E.2d 100 (1954); Seattle v. Gordon, 51 Wash. 2d 51, 342 P.2d 601 (1959).
102. See pp. 1080-81 supra.
103. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 37 U.S.L.W. 4359 (U.S. Apr. 22, 1969); Smith v.
United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
104. Compare Crabtree v. State, 238 Ark. 358, 381 S.W.2d 729 (1964), with State cx rel.
Register v. MaGahey, 12 N.D. 535, 97 N.W. 865 (1903).
105. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). See also Walker
v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (semble).
106. E.g., Fmn. R. CQaz. P. 41(e). It is of course not possible to find consent to the
examination under these circumstances. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
107. The hearing as proposed is an abbreviated one. See p. 1081 supra. At present,
detailed examination of the warrants and affidavits is exceptional. See articles cited In
note 47 supra.
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evaluationl08 by a trial court seems necessary for those close cases in
which a suspect chooses to risk punishment by challenging a mag-
istrate's authorization.
108. This conclusion is buttressed by the lack of an appeal from the warrant-issuing
procedure. Cf. People v. Ortiz, 29 App. Div. 2d 592, 280 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1967) (semble).
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